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mortgage wholly covers the mortgaged land, as distinguished from a
mortgage of an undivided interest. The only case in point,6 not
cited by court or counsel in the Layton case, reaches a contrary re-
sult, applying the tenant in common rule denying the mortgagee's
assignees the right to share in the improvements, and logic at least
seems to support that holding. If A, the mortgagor, had retained
his equitable title, as co-tenant he could not have shared in the im-
provements on partition, nor could T as mortgagee claiming under
him.7 Should the fact that the improver has purchased the interest
of A increase the rights of the mortgagee? Could it not be strongly
argued that there was a tenancy in common at the time the improve-
ments were made? Since undeniably T was a legal tenant in com-
mon by virtue of his holding legal title, it seems that the tenant in
common rule could be applied as against T.
J. G. ADAMS, JR.
Municipal Corporations-County Bonds-Effect of Thirty Day
Limitation on Validity of Bond. Ordinance
The County Finance Act of North Carolina provides, among
other things, that "... no order shall be passed (by any county)
for the issuance of bonds other than school bonds unless it appears
from said sworn statement (order) that the net indebtedness for
other than school purposes does not exceed five per cent of said
assessed valuation (of the county). . . ."1 It further prov'ides, that
the validity of a bond order shall not "be open to question in any
court upon any ground whatsoever," unless the proceeding shall be
commenced "within thirty days after the first publication of notice"
of the bond order.2 In Kirby v. Board of Commissioners of Person
County,3 a bond ordinance was adopted by the board of commission-
ers authorizing the issuance of bonds for court house and jail pur-
poses. The amount of this bond order raised the total indebtedness
of Person County above five per cent of its assessed valuation. Some
ninety days after notice of the bond order had been published, the
' The defendant purchased all the shares of several co-tenants in land and
erected improvements believing himself to be sole owner. The plaintiffs,
assignees of the holder of a prior mortgage on the share of one co-tenant, sue
to foreclose. Annely v. DeSaussure, 17 S: C. 394 (1881).
'Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 621; Annely v. DeSaussure, supra note 6.
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (17).
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (20).3Y98 N. C. 440, 152 S. E. 165 (1930).
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plaintiff instituted an action to restrain the commissioners of said
county "from proceeding further in the issuing and sale of said court
house a=d jail bonds and from levying said tax," because the issue
exceeded the five per cent limitation. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that "after the lapse of thirty days, if no suit had been
instituted, the bond ordinance is deemed to be valid for all purposes."
The broad language of this thirty day statute of limitation raises the
question whether it extends to every defect which might possiblyj
occur in the issuance of bonds under the Finance Act.
One of the main objects of the Finance Act was to raise the
credit standing of the counties by creating a uniform system of issu-
ing bonds and other instruments for obtaining money and of provid-
ing the means of paying therefor. The statute of limitation was
insertefl in the Act for the purpose of insuring the ready market-
ability of county bonds by precluding any attack upon the validity
of the bonds after thirty days from publication of notice of bond
orders.4 It is doubted, however, if the curative effect of this pro-
vision is as broad as its language would seem to indicate, namely, that
a bond order shall not "be open to question in any court upon any
ground whatsoever" after thirty days from publication of notice.
For, although the failure to attack a bond order within the pre-
scribed period would admittedly validate the bond issue as to any
statutory defects, 5 it ought not to apply to constitutional defects.
"The County Finance Act and the County Fiscal Control Act were both
passed in 1927, at which time the financial status of several of the counties
was deplorable. County debts were growing larger year by year and from
administration to administration. Consequently, their credit standing was low-
ered. Also, these debts.had to be paid. The Finance Act in providing for the
funding and refunding of county debts remedied the situation as it then ex-
isted. The Fiscal Control Act, in requiring a yearly budget by each county
of its expenditures, sought to prevent a recurrence of county deficits as existed
prior to 1927.
The Finance Act, after setting forth certain purposes for which bonds may
be issued, provides, in general, the following procedure which a county must
comply with in issuing bonds: (1) The county commissioners must first intro-
duce a res6lution to issue bonds. This is known as an "order," and it cannot
be passed at the meeting at which it is introduced. (2) This order shall state:
(a) the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued; (b) the amount of the
bonds; (c) that a tax sufficient to pay off these bonds, when due, shall be
annually levied and collected; (d) that a statement of the county debt has
been filed with the clerk, and is open to public inspection; (e) "and a clause
stating the conditions upon which the order will become effective, and the same
shall become effective in accordance with such clause, which clause shall be as
follows:" [see N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (9)].
'The General Assembly of North Carolina has the power over and control
of taxation in the state (Art. II, §14, Const. of N. C.), thus, the Assembly
may provide, in any way it deems wise, for the issuance of bonds by counties
and prescribe the conditions upon which they shall become effective-so long
NOTES AND COMMENTS
That is to say, the failure of the order to comply with any consti-
tutional provision might be urged in attacking the validity of the
bonds, at any time. For example, where the authority to issue bonds
is not given in accordance with the constitutional provision, or where
bonds are issued for other than necessary purposes, a vote of a
majority of all the registered voters is required by the Constitution.8
The Finance Act, in compliance with the Constitution, requires that
"if the bonds are for a purpose other than the payment of necessary
expenses, . .. the order shall take effect when approved by the
voters of the county. . . .,,7 Suppose then, that a bond order stated
that the bonds were to be issued for a necessary purpose, and was
therefore not submitted to a vote of the people, when, in fact, the
purpose for which they were issued was not a necessary one at all.
To validate the bonds in the face of such a defect by holding that
"after the lapse of thirty days, if no suit had been instituted, the
bond ordinance is deemed to be valid for all purposes," would be to
uphold a statutory enactment in direct contravention of a constitu-
tional limitation.8
It is conceded that in the instant case plaintiff's failure to object
within thirty days was fatal because the objection was based upon
a statutory defect. It is submitted, however, that when the .Supreme
Court is called upon to review an attack on a bond issue which is
based upon a failure to comply with some constitutional provision,
the thirty day statute of limitation, as provided for in the Finance
Act, will be held not to apply. It would seem that such a result was
contemplated by the legislature, for the Finance Act provides that
"every provision of this act shall be construed as being qualified by
constitutional provisions whenever such construction shall be neces-
sary in order to sustain the constitutiohality of this act."9
J. FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
as such legislative action is in accordance with the constitutional limitations
(Art. VII, §7, Const. of N. C.). See, Com'rs v. Smuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 28
S. E. 539 (1897) ; Claybrook v. Com'rs, 114 N. C. 453, 19 S. E. 593 (1894).
'Const. of N.C., Art. VII, §7.
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (9).
S "In the absence of special constitutional restriction, the legislature may
confer ,the taxing power upon municipalities in such measure as it deems ex-
pedient-in other words, with such limitations as it sees fit, as to the rate of
taxation, the public purposes for which it is authorized, and the objects (the-
persons, business and property) which shall be" subjected to taxation; but it
cannot, of course, confer greater power than the state itself possesses, and it
must observe the restrictions and limitations of the organic law." DILLON,
MUNICiPAL CoRpoRATI6xs (5th ed.), §1376 (640); Ex parte Montgomery, 64-
Ala. 463 (1879).
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (3).
